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Suicide: The Next Pro-Life Frontier 
Dennis J. Horan and Edward R. Grant 
The following article, b\' Dennis Horan, an appuintee to the 
Congressional Commiffee on Biuethics, and his culleague, E(hl'Grd Crant, 
was published in the Respect Life Magazine in 1985. It was copl'righted b.l' 
the U. S. Catholic Conference and is reprinted here \\'ith permissiun. 
Suicide was once a taboo subject for public disc ussion. Today. howeve r. 
it is properly recognized as a leading public health problem . For exa mple. 
its increasing rate has made suicide the third leading cause of deat h among 
adolescents. Nevertheless. American attitudes toward suicide are currently 
in a posture of ambivalence. The rate of suicide. particularly among 
teenagers , is increasing at an alarming ra te. This raises a call for public 
concern , for increased attention to the mental hea lth of adolescents , and 
for growth in suicide prevention efforts. 
At the same time , however. there is increasi ng clamor for acceptance of 
su icide as a "rational" choice , particularly for the terminally ill and the 
handicapped. "Self-deliverance" societies from France, Great Britain and 
the United States have boldly advocated this stance by publishing manuals 
with detailed "recipes" for lethal poisons. "Suicide pacts" have been 
publicized by the death of author Arthur Koestler and his wife, Cynthia, 
and by the death of Jean Humphrey, an Englishwoman whose husband, 
Derek , has since moved to the United States , remarried , and founded the 
Hemlock Society, the purpose of which is to create an aura of socia l and 
moral acceptance for suicide and to create a legal right to assist at suicide. 
Proponents of this position have argued in court that a right to suicide is 
protected under the 5th and 14th Amendments of the United States 
Constitution . 
All of these factors are converging to shape pub lic policy and public 
attitudes toward suicide within the United States, and to challenge the 
traditional attitude of opposition to suicide as reflected in current law 
which makes assisting at suicide a crime in most states in America and 
most countries in the world. Under current law, suicide has been 
decriminalized in most jurisdictions, not out of approval for the practice , 
but because of recognition that the victim of a failed suicide attempt is not 
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deserving of society's punishment, but rather, of society's assistance. This 
means that the act of suicide itself is no longer considered by the law to be 
the legal equivalent of self-murder which, under the early English common 
law, could result in dire punishment when the attempt failed, or loss of 
family wealth when successful. 
However, prohibition against assisting suicide either directly by statute, 
or by case law interpreting acts of assistance as equivalent to the 
commision of homicide, are still in existence in most states. It is these la ws 
which are likely to come under attack by the advocates of "rational" 
suicide. This could come about by direct challenge, i.e. , by an individual 
who wishes to commit suicide with the assistance of others, asking the 
court to strike down such law which prohibits that assistance, or by virtue 
of a criminal defendant charged with assisted suicide raising the decreased 
victim's alleged constitutional "right to suicide" as a defense to his own 
actions . Such defense, they argue , is supported in law by the case of Roe v. 
Wade, which found the right of privacy in the Constitution to be broad 
enough to contain a woman's right to abortion and by the case of Karen 
Ann Quinlan which expanded the individual's right of privacy to protect 
other persons involved in the decision to terminate life-support systems. 
To the contrary, the law has always recognized the state's legitimate 
interest in the prevention of suicide. This interest has been long recognized 
and has been re-examined and re-affirmed in the recent spate of 
termination of treatment cases. This state interest is strong enough to 
allow the temporary restraint and even incarceration of potential suicides 
in order to protect them from themselves. Society has always praised the 
state's efforts to assert this interest in order to prevent citizens from 
self-harm. The civil law has recognized a similar interest in each citizen by 
allowing them to interfere in order to prevent a potential suicide. Such 
interference is not classified by the law to be a breach of the suicide's 
privacy nor is it an unlawful restraint or tort, such as assault and battery. 
If Court Found Right to Suicide 
However, if a right to suicide or to assist at suicide were found by courts 
in the Constitution or created by legislatures, then interference by either 
the state or an individual would be wrongful - amounting to a breach of 
that privacy and an assault and battery on the would-be suicide. In other 
words, prevention of suicide would then be an actionable wrong for which 
the would-be suicide would be entitled to damages. Under these 
circumstances, persons, agencies and public bodies would interfere with a 
potential suicide only at their peril, having first reconciled themselves to 
the potential suit by the would-be suicide for a breach of his / her civil 
rights, resulting in the imposition of actual damages, possible punitive 
damages and, certainly, court costs and attorney's fees. By the creation of a 
constitutional right to suicide, the societal help would-be suicides need so 
badly - both medically and otherwise - would be effectively prevented. 
Thus a supposed public policy - a right to suicide argued to be beneficial 
for self-autonomy and freedom - would be most harmful to the very ones, 
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the potential suicides , whom the policy was supposedly created to protect 
- a public policy irony which should not be overlooked by the progenitors 
of these policies. There would be no legal way to help the thousands of 
would-be suicides by first interfering with their suicide attempt and then 
assisting them in solving their problems. Studies have shown that the 
attempt at suicide is a cry for help. It would indeed be ironic if creating a 
new constitutional right would effectively stifle all help legitimately 
asserted in response to another citizen's cry for help. Surely we are capable 
of better solutions to our public policy problems. 
At issue in any such case attempting to create a constitutional right to 
suicide will be the validity of society's traditional opposition to suicide 
- an opposition premised upon respect for the sanctity of all human life. 
Those who support the right to suicide and the right to assist at suicide 
generally emphasize two basic themes to counter this sanctity of life ethic. 
First , they maintain that life itself is not an absolute good , but is only one 
among a series of goods from which all human beings must make choices. 
Among these other goods are freedom from pain, dignity, intellectual 
capacity, physical ability - those things which give life its quality. In order 
to serve one or more of these goods, incases where life has become painful 
or burdened by loss of human capabilities and enjoyments, the taking of 
one' s own life may be a "rational" choice, they argue. The second theme is 
the principle of personal autonomy. The argument is that society has no 
right to interdict against suicide because it is a matter which solely 
concerns the person choosing to take his or her own life . The autonomy 
principle, they argue , permits an individual to make and carry out the 
purportedly "rational choice" in favor of suicide. In legal terms, they find 
the genesis of the autonomy principle in the unwritten right of privacy 
which the Supreme Court, in 1973, found to encompass a woman's 
decision to obtain an abortion. 
Focus of Proponents 
The proponents of rational suicide and personal autonomy focus great 
attention on the plight of the terminally ill and the handicapped. Their 
cause was personified in the Koestler case, where the terminally ill author 
and his healthy wife took simultaneous drug overdoses , and in the case of 
Elizabeth Bouvia. Mrs. Bouvia, a quadriplegic victim of cerebral palsy from 
birth was, despite her handicap , married and employed. In 1983, however, 
after the failure of her marriage and other setbacks , she admitted herselfto 
the psychiatric ward of a California hospital and requested that she be 
allowed to starve herself to death, while receiving care for pain relief. The 
hospital refused her request , whereupon Mrs . Bouvia went to court, 
seeking an order to have her wishes enforced. The court denied her request, 
ruling that Mrs. Bouvia had no right to force the hospital to cooperate in 
her suicide plan. However, the court did state that she "has a fundamental 
right to terminate her life". No explanation was given for the origins or 
limits of this right; however, if other courts agree that the right is 
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"fundamental" under the U.S. Constitution, any efforts to prevent suicide 
by competent adults. or to punish those who assist in suicid e, would be 
f rui tless. 
The cases of Arthur Koestler and Elizabeth Bouvia, while important, do 
not tell us enough about contemporary attitudes toward suicide. Between 
1969 and 1979, deaths from suicide in the United States increased approxi -
mately 22 percent. Most of this increase was attributable to a drastic 
rise in the suicide rate for those aged 15-24. Suicides in this age group 
increased 74 percent among males and 33 percent among females. In 1981 
alone. 5.600 young men and women under age 25 took their own lives. In 
communities as geographically disparate as Texas, New York and Illinois, 
suicide "epidemics" have been reported. It is noteworthy that rates of 
suicide among teenagers in affluent areas are part icu larly high. In such 
communities. there is often a prevalent pressure to achieve, which is 
reinforced by both parents and peers. leaving troubled adolescents in an 
isolated position. However. suicides are not limited to the "under-
achiever" or the outcast; honor students. star athletes. and homecoming 
queens are among the victims . This demonstrates that lack of se lf-love and 
self-esteem is not limited to those who have failed in their pursuit of the 
material goals of American society. nor is the need for unconditional love 
and acceptance any less for those who have achieved highly. Adolescents 
are particularly susceptible to despondency resulting from a gap between a 
high level of expectation or achievement and a low sense of self-respect. 
One positive development on the issue of suicide is the increased 
attention of physicians and mental health professionals to the problem. 
Their work has served to increase the possibilities of successfully 
identifying and treating the potential suicide victim. Studies have also 
confirmed that. in general. suicide victims are probably afflicted with a 
prior psychiatric disorder. Implicitly. this means that there are signs of 
psychological disorder even before a person manifests specific suicidal 
thought and behavior. Among adolescents. the withdrawal induced by 
such prior disorders can take many forms. Immersion into schoolwork is a 
possible means of withdrawal. as is avoidance of work. family and 
responsibility. 
Three Typical Conditions 
One researcher has identified three conditions which are present in 
virtually every suicide: abnormal se lf-hatred. a negative mental attitude, 
and a narrow constriction of the mind which allows the person to see only 
the unbearable difficulty. and only one means of escape. These three 
condit ions may bring about a suicide when the victim concludes that 
cessat ion. or death. is the only way of putting a stop to the unbearable 
pain. Ironically. it is when this conclusion has been reached that the suicide 
victim will often experience a sudden lifting of sadness. depression or 
isolation . Having decided upon a solution, and having resolved, single-
mindedly , to carry out that solut ion. the victim may give the false 
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appearance of recovery and improved outlook on life. The inner reality, 
however, is much different. 
Researchers have also identified credible warning signs of suicide, 
particularly among adolescents. These signs range from the obvious 
(previous suicide attempts, expressions of a desire to end life and purchase 
of lethal materials or weapons) to the subtle (giving away of prized 
possessions, changes in behavior or long-established habits , family 
disruptions). Since most victims give some warning of their intent , crisis 
intervention techniques may be employed to divert a potential suicide and 
obtain necessary professional help . The primary "technique' for 
intervention is to show the potential victim that someone really cares - by 
listening, being affirmative and suggestive, and taking seriously the 
victim's emotional or psychological distress . However, these are only 
primary steps. A serious situation such as this requires appropriate expert 
assistance and consultation. 
Stories of suicide reported in the media further belie any notion that this 
can be a rational, ethical or in any way beneficial course of action. All of 
the characteristics of the suicide victim discussed above are present in the 
cases of "celebrity" suicide : Jean Humphrey, Arthur and Cynthia 
Koestler , Elizabeth Bouvia. The manner of death of these vict ims displays 
no heroism and evokes little admiration. Their stories are essentially 
stories of despair, of hopelessness and lack of courage. They are to be 
pitied for the depth of spirit into which they sank before their deaths, but 
one would scarcely wish to emulate their condition, or their response . 
Their decision to react to their condition by choosing "cessation" means 
that they had denied all possibility of fulfillment or enjoyment for the 
remainder of their lives. The advocates of rational suicide claim that they 
are not pro-death, that they are simply refusing to attach "absolute" value 
to life and instead, are considering life in the context of other "goods," 
loosely defined as the "quality" of life. However, the attitudes and actions 
of the victims of so-called rational suicides demonstrate that these deaths 
are just as nihilistic and desperate as any other act of suicide. Life is not a 
"good" like other goods which can be pursued for a time , then foresworn, 
and resumed once again. The decision to take one's life in anr situation is a 
declaration of the utter futility and meaninglessness of that life. The 
Judeo-Christian tradition has always treated such despair as a grave 
matter, a lthough the Church now recognizes that judgment of such actions 
must take into account subjective factors such as psychiatric illness or 
chemical dependency on the part of the victim. Yet one need not call upon 
religious tradition to understand that such a declaration offutility is not a 
rational or ethical position, and even if such a declaration is made, that it 
hardly justifies the taking of one's own life. 
A Basic Ethical Principle 
As philosopher Germain Grisez has written, a basic ethical principle 
common to many systems of secular philosophy is that one ought not to 
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attempt to serve a human good by acting in a way detrimental to other 
human goods. Put more abruptly, "The end does not justify the means." 
With regard to human personhood, this dictum mandates that persons 
never be treated as means to an end, but always as an end themselves. That 
is , respect for the human is a paramount value which may not be subverted 
in pursuit of other goods. To contravene this principle is to insult the 
dignity and potential of the individual, to diminish the capacity of this 
person to "flourish" in his own personhood, as Grisez puts it. One may 
even think, after due consideration, that the person being used as a means 
will benefit from the action , or at least not be harmed . However , this 
deliberation fails to take into account the qualities, potentialities and 
sensitivities of that person which cannot be known, even to that person 
himself. Any rational system of ethics must take into account these 
unknown possibilities; to do otherwise would be to deny a critical facet of 
the human nature. Hence, the utter desperation of the suicide victim , no 
matter how rational or possessed offaculties the victim appears to be , is in 
all cases a non-rational position which denies the possibility of other 
human goods to be served by the continuation of life. Unlike the 
hopelessly , terminally ill patient who foregoes a burdensome regimen of 
hospital treatment to die at home or in a hospice , the suicide victim is no 
longer open to any possibility for good which life may afford. Defiantly, he 
has declared that his life is devoid of value, and thus, may be destroyed . 
Thisjudgment is no more rational than that of the murderer who disclaims 
or is utterly indifferent to the value of the life he has taken. 
It may be argued that the case for the intrinsic, unknown potential of 
human life does not apply in all cases, that certain lives are utterly devoid 
of value , and that the individual is alone qualified to make thejudgment 
in this regard. However, this argument provides no basis for determining 
how or why that life is without value, other than to defer to the subjective 
vision of the potential suicide vict im. Indeed, any attempt to identify 
objective criteria for determining whether or not a life has value would 
result in the classification of all persons sharing such criteria as having 
meaningless lives. From this point , mandatory euthanasia or "suicide" of 
these individuals would be a relatively small step. Thus, any defense of 
rational suicide on supposedly objective criteria would necessarily 
implicate a much broader assault on the value of human life . Once the 
door is opened, there is no way to limit the application of suicide or 
assisting at suicide to a narrow category of carefully defined 
"humanitarian" cases as the progenitors of this policy argue. The aged, 
senile, ill and handicapped would all be at risk of coercive family and 
public health policies . Certainly, if the suicide is truly "rational," then it 
not only should be rational for this victim, but for all other persons faced 
with similar circumstances. If this "rational" choice is further refined to 
become the on/r rational choice for a person in these circumstances, then 
the link between "rational suicide" and "compulsory suicide" is firmly 
established . 
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Results of Rejected Notion 
If this notion is rejected , then we are left with the subjective vision of the 
potential suicide victim as the on ly arbiter of the intrinsic value for the 
victim's life. This alternative is equa lly unsatisfactory, for once again, it 
fails to identify any difference between the subject ive judgment of th e 
"rational" suicide victim as opposed to other su icid e victims. The 
"rationa l" suicide - Arthur Koest ler, Eli za beth Bouvia - believes that he 
or she has his / her entire life situation figured out and under contro l. Life 
holds no hope or promise other than suffering or pain or, perhaps , life 
holds no hope or promise which would justify the suffering of terminal 
illness or incapacitation. These persons ask that their judgment as to their 
own life's worth be respected . Their judgment. however, differs in no 
significant degree from that of any of the more than 5,000 teenagers who 
committed suicide in the past year. Society is traumati zed by such deaths, 
shocked at the waste of human potential. But the eth ic of rational suic ide 
cannot make an exception for these cases. These teenagers, sadly, were of 
the same mind as an Arthur Koestler or Eli zabeth Bouvia. Their lives held 
no hope or promise , and were full of unbearable psychic pain. They cou ld 
see no value in future existence, and their act of suicide was just as certain 
or defiant as any other. If the suicide ethic is to be applied consistently, 
then many or most of these teenagers must be classified as "rat ional" o r 
"justifiable" su icides. Attempting to distinguish the Koestler case because 
of terminal illness, or the Bouvia case because of disability , only brings the 
discussion back to the objective cr iter ia discussed above. If this is done , we 
are implicitly saying that the lives of the handicapped or terminally ill 
individuals are less worthy of respect than those of affluent teenagers. 
The case for rational suicide, therefore , appea rs to be little more than an 
attempt to rationalize suicide. Certainly, the rational su icide ethic provides 
no principled basis for treating certain suicides as "rational" and others as 
"irrational". Nor does it provide any basis for preventing a regimen of 
mandatory euthanasia / suicide of certain classes of persons. Indeed, the 
arguments for rational suicide are disturbingly similar to those proposed 
to support euthanasia, all essentially stemming from the notion that there 
is such a thing as a life not worthy to be lived . It is difficult to estimate what 
impact this et hic a lready has had upon society, but the impact is visible. In 
France, at least half-a-dozen suicide victims employed poisons or 
overdoses recommended in a suicide manual , and copies of the manual 
were found near their bodies. In the United States, adolescent suicide 
seems to have a ripple effect, as one suicide may lead other teenagers to 
view suicide as the deliverance from their problems. In countries all over 
the world, euthanasia is slowly gaining acceptance, as courts exonerate 
physicians who, by passive or active means, have brought the lives of 
terminally ill or profoundly disabled persons to an end. 
In all of this debate, the views of those who have considered or even 
attempted suicide, and ha ve recovered , are rarely heard. Once such person 
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is Anne-Grace Scheinin, the daughter of a manic-depressive suicide victim. 
Mrs. Scheinin was also manic-depressive, and attempted suicide several 
times by her early 20s. Viewing the grief and pain caused by her mother's 
suicide, Mrs . Scheinin resolved that she could never commit suicide. 
Writing in Newsweek in 1983, she said: 
Suicide is not a normal death. It is tragic beyond the most shattering ex peri ences. 
and the ultimate form of abandonment. There is no fate on which to place the 
blame. It rests squarely on the shoulders of the victim and the people left beh ind. 
many of whom spend the rest of their lives wondering. never knowing. if there was 
anything they could have done to prevent such a tragedy. 
There is something about suicide that . even when done as a n escape from an 
agonizing terminal illness . signals complete and utter defeat. It is without any 
sembla nce of nobility or pride. Life can become too heavy a burden to bear. but 
the release that suicide offers is not a triumph of life. the ultimate mastery of self 
over fate . but a grim renuncia tion of hope and a failure of the human sp irit. 
Testimony such as Mrs. Scheinin's convincingly demonstrates the 
danger and illogicality of the rational suicide position. Those who enjoy 
sound mental health can debate the merits of the suicide ethic in a detached 
fashion; however, those afflicted by numbing self-hatred and despair may 
grasp onto the suicide ethic as the encouragement they need to resolve their 
pain through self-destruction. Herein lies the insidiousness of the pro-
suicide position. It says to persons in times of weakness , stress and great 
anguish that their lives are not worth continuing. Rather than affirming 
human dignity, and offering assistance to both recognize and overcome 
the underlying problems afflicting the potential suicide, this ethic destroys 
the last glimmering vestige of self-esteem and encourages victims to step 
over the brink. Since it is recognized that suicide is almost always the 
product of pre-existing psychiatric disorder, to exploit the weakness 
brought about by such disorder by offering the alternative of suicide is 
inherently irresponsible. The only responsible course is understanding, 
love , and appropriate professional care and supervision. This course will 
not always be successful; however, our appropriate sympathy for the 
suicide victim should not blind us to the ultimate irrationality of his act. 
The victim ought not to be condemned, and his survivors ought not to be 
abandoned in their grief. Our reaching out to the survivor-victims to share 
their pain should convince us, if nothing else does, that the solution offered 
by the suicide eth ic does not alleviate, but rather exacerbates human 
suffering. 
The prospects for change in the law on suicide are uncertain. Advocates 
for the sanctity of life must be vigilant, however, for the proponents of 
suicide and euthanasia have a definite strategy to erode the legal 
prohibitions which now exist. Much as the proponents of abortion did 20 
years ago, these parties are attempting to lead the legal system away from a 
position of respect for the intrinsic value of all human life. 
In 1973, we were told by the Supreme Court that the life of the unborn 
was not "meaningful" because it could not exist without the mother's 
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su pport. In th e 1980s. we increas ingly hea r tha t th e lives of the 
ha nd icap ped , the termina ll y ill . the victims of Alzhei mer's d isease, a nd the 
chro nica ll y depressed are not mea ningful beca use they a re dependent on 
ot hers fo r basic mea ns of support. I n a society which g lo ri es in indi vid ua l, 
ma te ria l achi eve ment. such a n ethic has a way of cree ping into the p ublic 
consc iousness so tha t its prese nce is not detected until it has bee n 
successful in a lte ring public po licy. T his ethi c wi ll rece ive further impetus 
fro m t he eco no mic pressures a lready stra ining the hea lth ca re system . It is 
crit ica L the refo re, th a t pro-li fe effo rt s take acco unt of the problem of 
suicide, a nd tha t o pin io n leaders a nd citi ze ns speak o ut fo rcefully aga inst 
the pro-suicid e a nd pro-euthanas ia effo rts. As sta ted a t the beginning of 
t his a rticle. the ta boo o n public d isc uss io n of suicide has a ll but vanished . 
S up po rt ers o f the sa nctit y of li fe must be both bo ld a nd understa nding in 
coun ter ing the tend ency to make suicide mora ll y a nd socia lly acce pta ble 
a nd m ust be co nscio us of th e pe rsistent effo rts to lega li ze ass isted suicide 
which a re be ing exe rted no w subtl y, but which soon will be asserted boldly 
in courts a nd legisla tures. 
76 
Are You Moving? 
II the next issue 01 this journal should be delivered to a differ-
ent address, please advise AT ONCE. The return postage 
and cost of remailing this publication is becoming more and 
more costly. Your cooperation in keeping us up-to-date with 
your address will be most helpful. 
Linacre Qua rterly 
